Adversarial Resilient Cyber Effects for Decision Dominance Collaborative Research Program | W911NF 23 S 0016

Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs) - ARCEDD-CRP (W911NF-23-S-0016)

1) What is the ARCEDD-CRP funding opportunity?

The Adversarial Resilient Cyber Effects for Decision Dominance Collaborative Research Program (ARCEDD-CRP) is a Department of Defense (Army DEVCOM Army Research Laboratory) funding opportunity that supports basic and applied research aimed at improving how the Army identifies, predicts, and deliberately creates short, decisive advantages in cyberspace under contested conditions.

2) What is the program trying to achieve overall?

The program aims to expand the scientific foundations behind "cyberspace windows of superiority" (CWoS). These are time-bounded periods when friendly forces can operate in and through cyberspace with meaningful advantage and without prohibitive interference. The goal is to make these windows easier to measure, forecast, and engineer so leaders have multiple credible courses of action when cyber conditions are contested.

3) What are "cyberspace windows of superiority" (CWoS)?

CWoS are defined in the opportunity as time-limited windows in which friendly forces can operate through cyberspace with a meaningful advantage and without prohibitive interference. The program is seeking more rigorous, measurable, and operationally useful ways to determine when a window exists, what produces it, how long it lasts, and what actions can widen, extend, or exploit it.

4) Who is sponsoring and administering this opportunity?

The sponsor is the Department of Defense, specifically the Army DEVCOM Army Research Laboratory (ARL). The opportunity is administered as a discretionary science and technology R&D program.

5) What is the Funding Opportunity Number (FON)?

The Funding Opportunity Number is W911NF-23-S-0016.

6) What is the Assistance Listing (CFDA) number for this program?

The Assistance Listing (CFDA) number is 12.630.

7) What type of award instrument will be used?

The program uses a Cooperative Agreement instrument, and it is described as a collaborative research effort executed through individual awards under that Cooperative Agreement structure.

8) Is this basic research, applied research, or both?

Both. The notice describes the ARCEDD-CRP as supporting basic and applied research that strengthens how the Army understands and achieves advantages in cyberspace.

9) How is the research scope organized?

The opportunity is organized around two major research thrusts. Applicants may propose to one thrust independently or propose work that covers both thrusts together.

10) What are the two major research thrusts?

The two thrusts are: (1) research to explore and define CWoS in a more rigorous and operationally useful way (including theory, models, and experiments), and (2) Adversarial Resilient Cyber (ARC), focused on defensive capabilities that help create or preserve those windows even when the defender is under active attack or begins from a disadvantage.

11) What kinds of topics fit under the CWoS definition and measurement thrust?

Topics include theory, models, and experimental methods that help determine when a window exists, what conditions produce it, how long it might last, and what actions can widen, extend, or exploit it in operationally meaningful ways.

12) What kinds of topics fit under the Adversarial Resilient Cyber (ARC) thrust?

ARC research is expected to address defensive capabilities that resist intrusions, reduce attacker success probabilities, adapt during contact, and recover quickly with minimal loss of mission capability. The notice emphasizes autonomy and robustness in contested settings.

13) What major technical themes are emphasized across the program?

The program emphasizes cyber deception and cyber resilience, tied together with machine learning (ML), adversarial machine learning, and game-theoretic decision-making.

14) What does the program mean by "cyber deception" in this context?

Cyber deception in this program includes techniques that increase attacker uncertainty and disrupt attacker reconnaissance. Examples named in the opportunity include camouflage (making important assets look unimportant), decoys and honeypots (making fake assets look real), and dynamic manipulation of what an adversary believes about the network.

15) Is deception only intended to slow attackers down?

No. The opportunity frames deception not only as a way to waste attacker time, but also as a way to generate early warning signals for intrusion detection and to shape attacker behavior in ways that preserve friendly freedom of action during critical time periods.

16) What does the program mean by "cyber resilience"?

The notice describes a two-part resilience approach: (1) proactively building systems that resist compromise or limit the chance of compromise, and (2) planning for imperfection by developing fight-through and rapid recovery mechanisms so operations can continue and capabilities can be restored quickly even after successful attacks.

17) How important are machine learning (ML) and adversarial ML to this program?

They are central themes. The opportunity specifically calls out risks of ML in adversarial environments and expects proposers to consider how ML systems can be attacked and how to defend them so decisions remain reliable even under manipulation.

18) What adversarial ML threats does the program explicitly mention?

The notice explicitly mentions evasion, data poisoning, model inference, and related techniques as ways ML systems can be attacked in adversarial environments.

19) What does the program expect regarding defenses for ML systems?

Proposers are expected to develop defenses that still produce reliable decisions when data, sensors, or the learning process are being manipulated by an adversary.

20) Does the program expect solutions to work in realistic Army environments?

Yes. The opportunity states that research should be grounded in realistic constraints found in tactical networks, including limited compute, low bandwidth, energy limits, and high operational complexity caused by interconnected systems and high data rates.

21) Are enterprise-only solutions a good fit?

The notice indicates that solutions that only work in unconstrained enterprise settings or assume perfect communications are less aligned with the program goals.

22) Are experimentation and demonstrations required?

The opportunity states that experimentation and demonstration are not optional in spirit. The government expects theories and methods to be assessed through innovative experiments using relevant datasets, network scenarios, system configurations, and ML models tied to Army tactical and enterprise environments.

23) What kinds of experimental assets are expected to be used?

The notice mentions using datasets, network scenarios, system configurations, and ML models that are relevant to Army tactical and enterprise environments. It also notes potential transition to internal evaluation on Army experimentation platforms and modeling and simulation systems for promising approaches.

24) Does the program encourage collaboration with ARL researchers?

Yes. The program is designed to encourage close collaboration among awardees and with ARL researchers, and on-site collaboration at ARL facilities is encouraged.

25) How long is the program period and how are topics structured over time?

Topics run on a two-year cycle. The program is expected to start with seedling awards over an initial period, followed by an option for additional funding for up to three more years based on progress and an end-of-seedling assessment.

26) Can the solicitation change over time?

Yes. The notice indicates the solicitation may be amended annually to refine problem statements and scope for a given cycle, while remaining tied to longer-term program goals and aligned with internal Army research programs.

27) What is "Enhanced Research Program funding" and should applicants include it in proposals?

The opportunity notes there is a possibility of additional growth funding during the period of performance, referred to as Enhanced Research Program funding. However, proposals are instructed not to mention or plan around that mechanism.

28) Who is eligible to apply?

Eligibility is listed as unrestricted. The program encourages a diverse mix of applicants, including universities, for-profit companies, and nonprofits.

29) Are teams or partnerships allowed?

Yes. Teaming is allowed but not required, according to the notice.

30) Is there a citizenship requirement for personnel working on the project?

Yes. Due to facility access rules and the use of certain restricted software and modeling and simulation products, all individuals performing work under this program must be U.S. citizens.

31) Does the citizenship requirement apply only to on-site personnel at ARL?

The notice states that all individuals performing work under the program must be U.S. citizens, and it also specifies that any personnel needing access to ARL facilities must meet the citizenship requirement.

32) Where can the work be performed?

Work may be performed in any location as long as collaboration and access requirements are met, according to the notice. On-site collaboration at ARL facilities is encouraged.

33) Are there special restrictions for Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs)?

Yes. FFRDCs can only participate if they demonstrate the work is not otherwise available from the private sector and provide sponsor documentation confirming their authority and compliance with their FFRDC agreement.

34) How many awards will be made and to whom?

The notice indicates awards will be made to a single entity per award. That single entity may still include subawards.

35) What is the listed closing date in the posting?

The original closing date listed is 2023-10-13.

36) Is the program only intended for Army use cases?

No. While the motivation is Army multidomain operations, the notice states the results are also intended to translate to civilian critical infrastructure and other commercial environments where reliable connectivity and resilient networked operations matter.

37) What does "decision dominance" imply in the context of this program?

Based on the description, the research is intended to help military and civilian leaders maintain multiple credible courses of action during contested cyber conditions by improving understanding and control of time-bounded windows of advantage in cyberspace.